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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Agency-Intentional Torts-Liability of the Master
Although there are early cases to the contrary,1 it is now well settled
that the master may be held liable for the intentional torts of his serv-
ant.2 The liability of the master for such tortious conduct is said to
'MECHEM, LAW OF AGENCY §499 (3d ed. 1923); 57 C. J. S., MASTER AND
SERVANT §572 (1936).
'Gillis v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 223 N. C. 470, 27 S. E. 2d 283
(1943) ; Hammond v. Eckerd's, 220 N. C. 596, 18 S. E. 2d 151 (1942) ; Long v.
Eagle Co., 214 N. C. 146, 198 S. E. 573 (1938) ; Dickerson v. Atlantic Refining
Co., 201 N. C. 90, 159 S. E. 446 (1931).
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depend upon whether the servant was acting within the scope of his
employment.$ This rule is based on the theory that the master's work
is being performed and that the master is in a better position to minimize
the loss by preventing or spreading it.4
In the case of Charles Stores Co. v. O'Quinn,5 the plaintiff was
criminally prosecuted on a charge of stealing a blouse which he had
found in his car and attempted to exchange. After being acquitted the
plaintiff brought an action in the federal district court against the de-
fendant company for malicious prosecution on the ground that the
prosecution was instituted by the manager of the defendant's store.
The district court found that since the title to the blouse was in doubt,
the manager possessed the implied authority to recover the defendant's
blouse by the criminal suit.6 On appeal, the circuit court, reversing the
lower court, 'declared that the title to the blouse was never in question
and therefore the manager did not act within the scope of his authority
in instigating the action. The latter court stated,7 "It is too clear for
argument that the recovery of stolen property, that had been in undis-
puted possession of the store manager for nearly a month before the
arrest, was not the purpose of the prosecution." Since the cause of ac-
tion arose in North Carolina, both courts applied the North Carolina
law under the Erie doctrine.
Ordinarily it is held to be outside the scope of an employee's author-
ity to prosecute an offender even where the offense is committed against
the employer's property, unless the prosecution was previously author-
ized or subsequently ratified. Authority for the prosecution, however,
may be implied when the action is brought by an employee who is in-
trusted with the custody of property for the purpose of protecting, pre-
serving, or recovering such property.8 Where the action is brought
merely for the purpose of vindicating justice or punishing the offender
no liability rests upon the master.9
The North Carolina courts have experienced great difficulty in de-
termining what circumstances make the question of implied authority
one for the jury. Thus, a carrier was held not liable as a matter of law
'RFSTATEMENT, AGENCY §219(1) (1936).
'Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk, 38 YALE L. J. 584(1929).
178 F. 2d 372 (4th Cir. 1949).
O'Quinn v. Charles Stores Co., 86 F. Supp. 240 (M. D. N. C. 1949).
Charles Stores Co. v. O'Quinn, 178 F. 2d 372, 376 (4th Cir. 1949).
'Hammond v. Eckerd's, 220 N. C. 596, 18 S. E. 2d 151 (1942).
'In Daniel v. Atlantic C. L. R. R., 136 N. C. 517, 522, 48 S. E. 816, 818 (1904)
where a passenger was arrested in a hotel room and charged with larceny of the
company's money at the instigation of the company's agent, the court dismissed
the case, saying: "A servant intrusted with his master's goods may do what is
necessary to preserve and protect them, because his authority to do so is clearly
implied by the nature of the service, but when the property has been taken from his
custody, or stolen, and the crime has already been committed, it cannot be said that
a criminal prosecution is necessary for its preservation and protection."
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where its dispatcher prosecuted a passenger who refused to abide by
the carrier's segregation regulations ;1o but an earlier case allowed the
jury to determine whether a carrier was liable where its driver wrong-
fully accused and prosecuted a passenger who refused to pay his fare."
In the former case, it might well be argued that the dispatcher's action
was for the purpose of enforcing the master's regulations and not for
the object of punishing the offender, thereby presenting a proper ques-
tion for the jury.
In another case where a customer was prosecuted by an employee
for uttering a supposedly worthless check, the jury was allowed to find
the master liable since the action was commenced to collect the master's
debt ;12 but where a manager was expressly forbidden, except at his own
risk, to accept checks, and the agent prosecuted a party for supposedly
issuing a bad check, the court held the act unauthorized.13 It seems
that in the latter case there was evidence of implied authority to prose-
cute inasmuch as the manager, though assuming personal responsibility
for the checks, was permitted to vest the title in the principal by daily
depositing them to the principal's bank account. Thus, the manager
was at least partially serving the master's business. 14
Cited in the principal case are several false arrest cases which follow
the same general pattern as those of malicious prosecution. To hold
the master liable for a false arrest instigated by his servant, the act
must be done for the purpose of protecting his master's property or of
furthering the master's business. So where the defendant's foreman had
plaintiff arrested to get him "out of the way" so that the foreman could
string telephone lines across the objecting plaintiff's land, the jury was
allowed to find the defendant company liable.15 Similarly, an employer
has been held liable where his manager arrested a salesman suspected of
embezzlement.' 0
In Hammond v. Eckerd's of Asheville,"' cited in the instant case,
a cigar clerk followed a customer out of a drug store, accused him of
"0 Pridgen v. Carolina Coach Co., 229 N. C. 46, 47 S. E. 2d 609 (1948).
" Kelly v. Durham Traction Co., 132 N. C. 368, 43 S. E. 923, rehearing denied,
133 N. C. 418, 45 S. E. 826 (1903).
"Dickerson v. Atlantic Refining Co., 201 N. C. 90, 159 S. E. 446 (1931), 10
N. C. L. REv. 90.
"Lamm v. Charles Stores Co., 201 N. C. 134, 159 S. E. 444 (1931), 9 N. Y.
U. L. Q. REv. 238.
" Nelson Business College v. Lloyd, 60 Ohio St. 448, 54 N. E. 471 (1894) (jani-
tor pushed electrician off table so janitor could finish cleaning).P. Jacklson v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 139 N. C. 347, 51 S. E. 1015 (1905).
"Kelly v. Newark Shoe Store Co., 190 N. C. 406, 130 S. E. 32 (1925). Cf.
West v. Messick Grocery Co., 138 N. C. 166, 50 S. E. 565 (1905) (client not liable
for attorney's arrest of debtor); Lovick v. Atlantic C. L. R. R., 129 N. C. 247,
40 S. E. 191 (1901) (client not liable for attorney's arrest of witness leaving
court's jurisdiction). But ef. Parrish v. Boysell Mfg. Co., 211 N. C. 7, 188 S. E.
817 (1936) (employer not liable, master's property not being recovered).
"7220 N. C. 596, 18 S. E. 2d 151 (1942), 11 FORDHAM% L. REv. 314 (criticizing
the holding).
1950]
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stealing cigars, and caused him to be searched. A divided court dis-
missed the customer's action for false arrest on the ground that the
clerk's act was not done to protect the master's property, but merely to
vindicate justice since the cigars had already been stolen. It was aptly
pointed out in the dissenting opinion that the cigar clerk was in hot
pursuit of the offender with the avowed purpose of recovering his mas-
ter's property and that the question of authority should have been de-
termined by the jury. In Long v. Eagle Co.,18 a case almost identical
on its facts, the court reached a result opposite to the holding in the
Hammond case. A possible distinguishing feature is that in the Eagle
case the arrest was instigated by an assistant manager rather than a
clerk.
In the principal case the court seemed to rely in part on an express
provision in the employment contract forbidding the manager to arrest
or prosecute an offender. Like provisions have received little considera-
tion by the court in many of the intentional tort cases. Thus, in a case
concerning defamation,19 an employer was held liable where a manager
followed a customer to a parking lot and there accused her of stealing
a package from the store. The court held that there was sufficient
evidence to warrant the submission of the case to the jury in spite of
the fact that such acts were violative of direct and positive instructions
to the contrary. This result seems sound. If it were otherwise, an
employer could rid himself completely of vicarious liability by the sim-
ple expedient of instructing his employees to commit no torts.
Analogous to the holding in the instant case are those cases involving
assaults by servants. The master is generally held liable if the assault
is actuated at least in part by a purpose to serve the master or protect
his property. Under this rule a master has been held liable where he
authorized some force, and excessive or improper force was used,20
or where an assault occurred during a foreman's inspection of an em-
" Long v. Eagle Co., 214 N. C. 146, 198 S. E. 573 (1938). In Kelly v. Newark
Shoe Store Co., 190 N. C. 406, 409, 130 S. E. 32 34 (1925), the court stated: "The
term 'manager' applied to an officer or representative of a corporation, implies the
idea that the management of the affairs of the company has been committed to
him with respect to the property and business under his charge. Consequently his
acts in and about the corporation's business, so committed to him, is within the
scope of his authority.... The term 'general manager' may imply still greater
authority, and although limited to the branch store at Wilmington, it still may
imply authority to act in emergencies, or generally, as the principal officer of the
corporation in reference to the ordinary business and purposes of the company in
the condluct of such store."
" Gillis v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 223 N. C. 470, 27 S. E. 2d 283(1943). Cf. West v. Woolworth Co., 215 N. C. 211, 1 S. E. 2d 546 (1939) (em-
ployer liable for employee's slander of customer) ; Sawyer v. Norfolk & S. Ry.,
142 N. C. 1, 54 S. E. 793 (1906) (employer liable for employee's slander of former
employee) ; Strickland v. Kress & Co., 183 N. C. 534, 112 S. E. 30 (1922) (em-
ployer not liable for employee's slander of former employee).
'0 Snow v. De Butts, 212 N. C. 120, 193 S. E. 224 (1937). Cf. Wilson v.
Singer Sewing Machine Co., 184 N. C. 40, 113 S. E. 508 (1922).
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ployee's machine;21 but where an assault was committed in spite or
hate, or to carry out an independent purpose of the servant, the master
was not liable.22
The result reached in the principal case seems to be in line with many
of the North Carolina cases in which intentional torts are involved. But
the court appears to be particularly harsh in denying the plaintiff re-
covery because the prosecution was instigated for a crime already com-
mitted against the master's property instead of for the purpose of re-
covering such property. This distinction made by the court seems more
apparent than real. Although the immediate object of the manager's
action might well have been to vindicate the law and punish the offender,
yet it cannot be denied that such prosecutions do tend to discourage
future criminal acts and thereby indirectly serve the master's interests.
This deterrent effect appears especially pertinent here in view of the
fact that the manager had been previously bothered by shoplifters. This
would seem to be sufficient evidence of an intention to further the mas-
ter's business and to protect his property so as to leave the question
for the determination of the jury.
In conclusion it might be pointed out that the North Carolina courts
have been more willing to submit to the jury cases involving negligent
torts of the servant as distinguished from willful torts. Perhaps this
action on their part has not been deliberate.2 Theoretically, however,
such a distinction has no basis and it is to be hoped that in the future,
where doubt exists as to the purpose for which a servant acted, such
doubt will be resolved by the jury whether his act be classified as negli-
gent or intentional. GEORGE J. RABIL.
Associations-Injunctive Relief Against Violation of
Its Rules by Members
It appears well settled that the constitution, rules, regulations and
by-laws1 of a voluntary association constitute a contract between the
22 Fleming v. Tarboro Knitting Mills, 161 N. C. 436, 27 S. E. 309 (1913).
22 In Snow v. De Butts, 212 N. C. 120, 193 S. E. 224 (1937), where a manager
assaulted the plaintiff who had opposed the defendant employer's petition to the
Corporation Commission, the defendant was held not liable although the act was
committed with an intent to benefit the master. A later case refused to let the
jury consider the master's liability where an employee assaulted a person outside
the master's premises as a result of an argument arising inside the store. Robin-
son v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 216 N. C. 322, 4 S. E. 2d 889 (1939), 18 N. C. L.
REv. 163 (1940).
2 It seems that as a practical solution to the tendencies of juries to find the
"deeper pocketed" employer liable, the courts, particularly in the field of agency
law, have frequently exercised judicial restraints in an effort to mete out justice
as they see it in the individual cases.
So long as the issue is the enforceability of the constitution, rules, regulations,
charter or by-laws, no distinction is necessary between them, and for purposes of
this note they are used synonymously.
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